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Abstract  
This article explores the social and material repercussions of middle class aspirations in 
a system that is still infused by socialist aesthetics in Maputo, Mozambique. We argue 
the activation of “middle classness” reproduces ingrained inequalities and boundaries. 
This is demonstrated through two ethnographic case studies of urban housing, long 
central to imaginaries of prosperity: First, fearing downward mobility, members of the 
upper middle class seek to embody a liberal ideology of ‘autonomy’, while 
simultaneously being dependent on state structures. Second, members of the lower 
middle class attempt to create enclaves to experiment with forms of privatization 
normally only accessible to a privileged elite. Through this examination of the ways in 
which a spectrum of privileged urbanites attempts to secure their position in the face of 
a precarious future, the article outlines middle classness under contemporary capitalist 
conditions and how this is shaped by the legacies of the past. 
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In recent years, the supposed ‘rise’ of a middle class in Africa has aroused significant 
interest among academics and development practitioners alike (Lentz 2015; Lopes 
2015; Melber 2016; Ncube and Shimeles 2013; Southhall 2016; Spronk 2012). This 
interest is spurred on by breathless reports from various agencies, such as the African 
Development Bank, which claim that over 300 million people on the continent are 
already members of the middle class as they have a purchasing power of between US$2 
and US$20 a day (Mubila et al. 2011) – irrespective of the cost of living. Such claims 
about the latent economic capacities of one of the world’s poorest regions have not gone 
unnoticed by a mixed bag of analysts, fuelling speculation about Africa’s bright future. 
Building on the implicit but powerful ideological subtext in the discourses of 
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institutions like the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (see Kalb 2014), these analysts suggest that the growing African 
middle class will ultimately become agents of transformation, producing the 
autonomous, responsible, governable and entrepreneurial liberal subjects who will lift 
the continent from decades of authoritarianism, poverty and despair (for wider examples 
see Heiman, Freeman and Liechty 2012, Kipnis 2007).  
In the following, however, we wish to cast a critical perspective on the alleged 
triumph of the middle, as it were, by focusing on particular ways in which discourses of 
“middle classness” in Mozambique are intertwined with broader processes of societal 
transformation. Rather than serving as a catalyst for securing a robust democratic 
societal integration, we argue that the activation of “middle classness” maps out and 
reproduce ingrained divides and boundaries between already existing socio-
geographical positions and statuses (cf. Lentz 2015). We build on insights from a 
growing body of work which emphasises how “middle classness” is performed under 
the constraints and opportunities unleashed by sweeping economic change (Buire 2017, 
Gastrow 2017, Mercer 2014, Pow 2009). Expanding on these crucial insights, we 
explore how middle classness is employed by differently positioned actors as a 
fractured political aesthetics that has been key to scaffolding the social and political 
landscape of Mozambique since independence in 1975. In this regard, the activation of 
“middle classness” provides a potent social and political framework for re-introducing 
or re-activating utopian, if dormant, projects of social engineering albeit in constantly 
mutating forms.  
An emphasis on the middle class as driver for social and economic chance does 
not by itself indicate that there is a phenomenon ‘out there’ that reflects the 
characteristics, which are seemingly captured by the concept. We will therefore refrain 
from providing a strict definition on who does or does not belongs to the middle class, 
but rather explore the ways in which social actors of varying levels of privilege and 
power employ ideas and strategies associated with the notion of the middle classness. 
We consider middle classness as referring to the multiple and overlapping social, 
political and economic effects of activating ‘middle class’ as a key driver of societal 
change in local urban environments. Whereas the middle class as a social category 
might never be fully formed, it does stencil into the urban fabric new and often unstable 
relationships of obligation and dependences. 
Housing provides the material focal point for local discourses of middle 
classness and forms of privilege, which we shall discuss below. For the Portuguese 
colonizers as well as for the ruling Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) government 
(in both its socialist and its neo-liberal renderings), housing has been central to urban 
political and economic reforms (Nunes Silva 2015; Saul 1985). It did not only establish 
one’s status for the world to see, it was also a vehicle through which both the state 
apparatus and social actors of varying levels of privilege attempted, in a fraught, often 
conflictual, coercive and hideously unequal manner, to constitute the social and 
aesthetic boundaries of what urban citizenship might mean. As noted by Dalakoglou 
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(2010), housing is not simply a physical structure; it is also a way of creating in a 
concrete form a set of cultural logics and social relations. Hence, in the case of Maputo, 
the nation’s worn-out capital, housing continues to function as an ideological vehicle for 
hardening social differentiations in the very materiality of the city (Roque, Mucavele et. 
al. 2016).  
In her work on Dakar, Melly argues that seemingly abstract shifts in policy, 
regulation and political economy are experienced in profoundly personal and embodied 
ways by the city’s residents (2017: 19). Although Maputo has a very different history, 
like Dakar, transformations in the urban political economy and housing policy are not 
simply felt in the context of economic livelihood strategies and forms of governance but 
affect also urban subjectivities in multiple and often inconsistent ways. If in Dakar, 
processes of structural adjustment and liberalisation have transformed the symbol of 
popular urban success from the salaried civil servant to the migrant, in Maputo this has 
been embodied by the transformation from the socialist vision of the homem novo (New 
Man) to the capitalist dream of the middle class citizen. Significantly, in Maputo, 
housing serves as an outward manifestation of what kind of person the occupant is, what 
their aspirations, desires and hopes for the future are (Nielsen 2016). These personal and 
shared hopes and ideas continue to be shaped by the legacies of the past.  
As we shall show, these legacies are central to what Ranciére called a ‘the 
politics of aesthetics’ (2004), that is, the organisation of what is sensible and what is 
unthinkable. For Ranciére, aesthetics constitutes ‘a system of a priori forms determining 
what presents itself to sense experience. It is a delimitation of spaces and time, of the 
visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place 
and the stakes of politics as a form of experience’ (2004:63). With a now famous 
phrase, Ranciére describes aesthetics as the ‘distribution of the sensible’  (partage du 
sensible), which refers both to the conditions of sharing that constitute a particular 
community and, at the same time, to the sources of dissensus, the contestation and 
differentiation of that very community (Rancière 2010; see also Panagia 2010). The 
distribution of the sensible precedes political involvement by determining what is 
socially visible, as it were, by creating a correspondence between perception and 
meaning. According to Ranciére, there is therefore always a particular ‘aesthetics’ at the 
heart of political processes (2004): In all socio-political arrangements, words, images 
and ideas are in constant circulation and these may at any moment be configured so as 
to give rise to dissent and strife.  
To a certain extent, aesthetic practices operate through acts of inclusion and 
exclusion within a common domain. They define and delimit a perceptible field 
precisely by specifying what can and cannot be seen within it. But this also indicates 
that a given distribution of the sensible might be configured otherwise. Ranciére 
reminds us that for any distribution to occur, certain criteria have to be in place that 
organize the ‘order of the distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their 
‘nature’ and places corresponding to their functions’ (1998:101), such as the socialist 
ideological imagery of proper moral conduct in the city. Aesthetic practices, then, 
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become political by reconfiguring the organization of the visible and the invisible and 
introducing new subject positions, images and ideas into the field of perception 
(Ranciére 2004:63).   
In Maputo, then, members of different urban factions, who associate themselves 
with ideas of the middle class both repudiate and are trapped by a defunct ideological 
project, which nevertheless conjures an increasingly fleeting memory of a nationalist 
utopia that collapsed long ago. Based on long-term ethnographic research carried out by 
both authors in Maputo, we explore the relationship of two groups of social actors who 
possess significant, if unequal, levels of social privilege enact the discourse of middle 
classness as a way of activating a dominant, if dilapidated political aesthetics. Inspired 
by Ranciére, we will subsequently argue that the result is the reproduction of a dual 
political aesthetics: Middle classness offers a kind of immediate political identification 
at a certain distance from the ideological mire in which the governing Frelimo party 
seems to have positioned itself. At the same time, however, the undercurrent of this 
political aesthetics is one that constantly pushes these urbanites back into the orbit of 
the Frelimo party and reactivates elements of the proper moral conduct for an urbanite. 
The result is the almost paradoxical consolidation of a social and political organisation, 
which very few urbanites want to preserve.   
The first configuration that we are examining consists of urbanites who are not 
part of the national political elite themselves but have occupied privileged societal 
positions since the early independence period and, in some cases, even since the 
colonial era (see also Pow 2009 for an account of the flexibility of the label middle class 
in China). Many would be popularly considered as members of an elite due to their 
professions and salaries, but perhaps more importantly for a variety of social and 
political factors. This includes individuals’ closeness to the powerful, in a political 
system jokingly referred to as a ditadura de apelidos (dictatorship of surnames, 
referring to the party ‘aristocracy’, who monopolize power and, since the fall of 
socialism, economic opportunities). The drive to be associated with a national middle 
class here basically serves as a way to legitimise privilege, while simultaneously 
drawing a distinction between themselves and what they view as a corrupt and 
increasingly malignant elite.  
The second configuration focuses on an experimental appropriation of ‘middle-
classness’ by urbanites whose socio-economic status does not seem to afford such 
privileges. In general, these urbanites work at the lower levels of the state and municipal 
apparatus and are both socially and, indeed, materially, at considerable distance from 
society’s main power holders. Throughout Maputo, recently built compounds and 
‘gated communities’ offer new opportunities for increased privacy and security to a 
growing number of those urbanites, who want to escape from the disorder, weak 
infrastructure and paltry social services of the city centre. While the majority of these 
urban enclaves are built for the elite, several compounds are probably best considered as 
social housing projects intended for officials with limited financial capacities. To many 
residents living in these compounds a semi-detached house surrounded by peers with 
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relatively similar economic and social background is not an ideal situation. Young state 
officials hope to eventually leap beyond the constraints of the middle class and enter the 
hallowed halls of the party aristocracy, whose status and privileges presumably give 
them complete freedom and autonomy. Here, the activation and usage of ‘middle-
classness’ is nothing but a steppingstone that allows for an initial experimentation with 
forms of privatization that are otherwise the privilege only of the wealthy elite. As a 
manifestation of a Ranciérian double political aesthetics, these sections of the urban 
population seem to material embody a social ideal, which is also nearly impossible to 
achieve.  
Hence, in both instances we find urbanites who are alienated from the state but 
who, as we shall see in the following, through their respective actions and practices, 
come to reproduce a crumbling social order, whose symbolic tropes have survived into 
the present day despite its ideological promises being long broken. 
 
A fractured political cosmology: The making of socialism in Mozambique 
In Lourenço Marques, as the capital was known in the colonial period, housing was 
strictly segregated by race and class. From the well-appointed villas and modernist 
apartment buildings reserved for the settler elite in the cidade de cimento (cement city) 
all the way to the ramshackle huts on the outskirts of the cidade de caniço (reed city), 
housing was emblematic of a colonial system of stratification. Indeed, both the forms of 
housing – its aesthetics, location and uses – and the moral qualities ascribed to domestic 
life were central to the colonial state’s extremely limited ‘civilizing’ project of 
assimilação (assimilation). For this relatively privileged, if miniscule fraction of the 
population that achieved the status of assimilados and a house made of wood and zinc 
as opposed to commonly used reed constructions was not only a symbol of success, this 
form of dwelling was a legal requirement for the status of assimilado (Morton 2019: 
37). A house made of wood and zinc symbolised an entry into a form of urban 
citizenship which allowed preferential access to education, employment and freedom 
from forced labour, and the ability to reside in a part of town that was relatively well-
serviced and luxurious in comparison to that of the Indígenas (indigenous or natives).  
Much of Frelimo’s political leadership was drawn from embittered, former 
assimilados who agreed with the colonizers that Mozambique’s population was 
profoundly backwards, but who nevertheless advocated a dramatically different 
solution. The kind of socialism which they championed combined elements of their 
assimilado scepticism towards so-called ‘obscurantist’ traditional social structures and 
institutions with broader, leftist ideological currents (See Cruz e Silva 2001 for an 
illuminating discussion on the role of the Protestant Church in shaping Frelimo´s 
ideology, a detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper). The result 
was a nationalist version of Marxist-Leninism carrying a new ‘civilizing’ project that 
was more ambitious and wide-ranging than the wildest dreams of the colonizers. Its 
goals, utopian in nature and authoritarian in practice, were to abolish patriarchy, 
gerontocracy, selfish individualism, tribalism, rural feudalism, superstition, 
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obscurantism and other ‘backwards’ cultural practices as part of a modernizing mission 
(Vieira 1977). In their place, a homogenized, ‘rational’ new man who selflessly strived 
for the collective good would emerge (ibid). 
After fighting an 11-year liberation struggle, Frelimo proclaimed independence 
in 1975 and set out to implement its programme of social engineering to create a new 
national subject from the supposedly backward, fragmented population. A prime 
example in Maputo was the decree on the nationalization of the abandoned housing 
stock in the formerly colonial centre of town and the distribution of flats to cadres and 
urbanites who had previously resided in under-served bairros (Jenkins 1998, Pinsky 
1982, Nielsen 2020 forthcoming). The stated goals of this decree were to abolish the 
injustices of colonialism and build a national form of poder popular (peoples’ power) 
that would usher in a socialist society. However, the egalitarian presumptions of the 
regime concerning urban areas were predicated on a very particular understanding of 
what it meant to be an urban citizen. (see also Buire 2017 and Gastrow 2017). Morton 
argues, “To enjoy the privileges of the City of Cement, one had to already have certain 
privileges. Elites may have been muscling in to obtain the best properties, but the built 
inheritance itself also encouraged social segregation” (2019: 165). Not only was living 
in the city centre expensive in many ways not covered by subsidised rents, including 
costs for electricity and water, but the built environment was suitable for only certain 
kinds of economic activities. The apartment blocks of the city centre had no yards 
where people could open a shop or kiosk, or brew beer, activities that had long been 
economic mainstays for much of the urban population. “By 1979 most of the cement 
city was occupied, but not many family heads were working class, it was mainly the 
service sector and the bureaucracy” (ibid: 165).  While Frelimo attempted to open the 
cement city to all, it soon became a preserve of a relatively privileged nomenklatura, 
and once again modern urban citizenship became the preserve of the chosen few.  
Shortly after independence, the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and then 
apartheid South Africa formed and supported an internal rebel group, Renamo 
(Mozambican National Resistance), to destabilize their left-wing neighbour. Renamo 
built on dormant internal discontent with Frelimo’s social engineering, plunging the 
country into civil war (Dinerman 2006). The violence was worst in the rural areas, 
leading to a massive influx of refugees to the relative safety of the cities. During this 
period, Maputo’s outlying bairros expanded at an incredible rate, straining the capacity 
of the city’s authorities as the country slid towards economic meltdown.  
Maputo’s role in shaping the selfless new national citizen began to falter as the 
state struggled to sustain the population, while smuggling, pilfering, black marketeering 
and various other forms of what was labelled ‘economic sabotage’ became necessary to 
ensure survival (Buur 2010). The socialist icon and first president, Samora Machel, 
signalled a change of direction in 1983 and various market mechanisms were tentatively 
reintroduced, a pace that accelerated dramatically after Machel’s death in 1986. 
Reforms came with increased aid from the ‘west’, but life for urbanites became even 
more precarious as the currency was devalued, salaries were cut and corruption, once 
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relatively rare, flourished. By the late 1980s, the previous socialist dreams remained as 
slogans, but otherwise had little relationship to people’s daily lives. Despite its 
revolutionary promises, however, Frelimo’s socialist-inspired dreams of a brave new 
world collapsed irrevocably at the end of the civil war. Crucially for the present 
discussion, however, the underlying discourse of radical societal transformation 
survived, albeit in a reconfigured and less politically charged form (Nielsen 2014; 2017, 
Sumich 2016, 2018). For, as we shall shortly see, if the nation could not be made 
autonomous and modern, privileged social subjects still could be.   
  
Middle-class articulations and the party-state machine (1990 to present)  
Around 1990, while the civil war between Frelimo and Renamo lurched towards its 
conclusion, many of those urbanites who had once been the epitome of the socialist 
‘new man’ became enamoured with the beguiling opportunities of the market (Pitcher 
2002, 2006). The embrace of capitalism would soon transform urban life and social 
relations as the government moved to privatize the housing stock, for symbolic prices, 
opening the door for home ownership and even the possibility of becoming a landlord. 
Senhor Marques, a former minister, explained the process as follows: 
  
We had to get the government out of the housing market, the stock was 
rapidly deteriorating and the state simply could not take care of it. We 
thought that we had to help the people and so we did… it was an ad-hoc 
move without long-term planning. Initially, with housing privatization 
the idea was that one was only able to buy the house that they were 
renting, the trading came later. However, there were many ways around 
this as people started registering houses in the names of their wives or 
children. They would buy houses, still cheap, from a person whose salary 
was so small that they could not pay for it, or through the trading.         
 
The growth of a thriving real estate market, while seemingly unintended, was in many 
ways the epitome of Frelimo’s version of capitalism, as it created a vital commodity, 
but where the market was characterized by confusion and ambiguity, allowing the 
powerful significant leverage (Jenkins 2001, Negrão 2004). The privatization of 
housing also allowed actors to control an asset that was distinct from political office, but 
where the access to such a commodity was, to varying degrees, dependent on political 
connections and luck. One particularly widespread informal system was known as 
‘vender a chave’ (selling keys). This is when you find a person who is renting a 
government house, but does not have the money to buy it, although they are very cheap; 
one trades the house they have for the rented one and then buys it from the government.  
Under successive structural adjustment programmes, which began in the mid-
1980s, industries closed and salaries in the nation’s largest employer, the state 
bureaucracy, were frozen. In this unstable situation, members of the party aristocracy 
used their political base to accrue economic power (Castel-Branco, et al. 2001; Pitcher, 
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2002). As is sadly common throughout Africa, these programmes did not usher in a new 
era of prosperity, but rather solidified and intensified existing hierarchies and 
inequalities (Melly 2017: 36). Nor did economic liberalization free the nation from the 
‘dead hand of the state’; in fact, Frelimo soon became a major economic actor through 
partnerships with multinational actors in its own right, keeping important segments of 
the economy under its control (Pitcher, 2002). While the elite was able to expand from 
its political base and become a powerful economic player, most urban Mozambicans 
faced deepening and persistent precariousness, especially with the massive job losses 
that accompanied privatization.  
In such a situation, ‘the great housing giveaway’ was probably among the more 
economically inclusive aspects of capitalism in Maputo, even if it still primarily 
benefitted a relatively narrow, politically connected segment of the population. Through 
the acquisition of multiple houses, one could amass capital, especially by charging 
foreigners and NGOs staggeringly high rents. Sumich was told of duplexes in Maputo, 
where Mozambicans would pay US$3 a month in rent to the state while NGOs, 
considered as private agents, would pay US$10,000. Although this story may be 
apocryphal, it does illustrate the sense of disjunction and possibility that characterized 
the time. In many cases, rents were often invested in further education, enabling former 
members of the nomenklatura to obtain often rotating employment with the state, 
foreign NGOs and newly privatized businesses. This group of privileged post-socialist 
urbanites, was enterprising, at least in relation to the narrow channels that were open to 
it, but remained largely dependent on the party-state (see Soares de Oliveira 2015 for a 
discussion of similar processes in Angola). The city centre, however, provided a finite 
resource for class consolidation. Much of the property was soon snapped up and the 
price of housing began to rise rapidly. In 2013, prices for a three-bedroom house in the 
affluent, central neighbourhoods of Maputo were close to US$1,000,000 putting it out 
of reach for all but the very top of the social hierarchy.  
For those who are privileged but cannot afford a house in the city centre and, 
unlike their parents, will not benefit from privatization, there is an archipelago of gated 
communities springing up throughout Maputo, Matola and neighbouring regions (Costa 
Forthcoming; Morange, Folio et al. 2012; Nielsen & Jenkins 2019 (In press); Quembo 
2009). These create some opportunities for achieving the middle-class domestic ideal 
but are based on deepening forms of exclusion. As one of Sumich’s friends, who lives 
in a gated community, pointed out ironically: ‘Yes, they built these with Chinese labour, 
even though we are surrounded with the shacks of the unemployed’. The ever-
increasing gated communities are carefully guarded from the wider population, but 
unlike the case with the mass distribution of the socialist period, only a few will ever 
reach them (cf. Paasche and Sidaway 2010).  
It may be argued that those who claim the mantle of ‘middle classness’ in 
Mozambique and elsewhere on the African continent are largely an outgrowth of the 
state that created them (Sumich 2016, 2018 see also Southall 2016 for a wider 
discussion). Land in Mozambique is still the property of the state, although citizens can 
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own surface rights (Andersen et al 2015a, McAuslan 2013). The lack of a clear overall 
legal framework concerning land rights and the seeming disinterest in creating one 
gives state officials significant leeway and bolsters the need for political connections. 
To this day, the state does not have a reliable register of property rights and has actively 
impeded any efforts to create one (Andersen, et al 2015a).1 The hunger for land is 
seemingly endless (Hanlon 2011; see also FIAN International Secretariat 2010; Wise 
2015): there is a scramble to take plots wherever they are available, even if far outside 
current municipal boundaries. In these instances, entrepreneurial urbanites get what they 
can and then wait for the city to arrive, which is expected to raise the value of the 
property. Instead of creating an independent middle class, though, the strategy of 
privatizing urban housing paradoxically tends to reinforce dependence on the state as 
the political process concerning land rights in urban areas is both top down and 
seemingly deliberately confusing (Jenkins 2013, Swedesurvey 1999). The lack of 
administrative coordination and control is what allows some local officials, such as the 
secretario do bairro (neighbourhood secretary), wide scope to conduct informal land 
deals and approve land rights according to their own personal agendas (Andersen et al. 
2015b, Negrão 2004). As local officials frequently sell the same plot of land to multiple 
people simultaneously, many urbanites consider it more expedient to simply stake one’s 
claim to land by building a small thatch or cement house based on the (often quite 
accurate) assumption that formal authorities consider the materiality of an object more 
valuable than a dubious paper title. With a dwindling supply of land near the capital, 
though, the post-socialist system of stratification has become etched in the landscape 
itself. Driving through the outskirts of Maputo one frequently sees plots of land 
encircled by concrete walls with a demolished thatch or cement house in the centre. In 
many instances, this is the result of some powerful or better-connected individual 
having taken over – often through informal means – the former owner’s claim to the 
land by simply levelling their house and building a more permanent, protective structure 
in its place.  
There is no doubt that Maputo’s physical landscape has been rapidly changing 
during the last few decades, not least as a result of the growing number of construction 
projects initiated either by local entrepreneurs or as public-private construction projects 
with foreign financial investors. In 2012, there were thus more than 80 gated 
compounds (condomínios) in and around the city centre (Costa n.d.), most of which 
were built to accommodate the national political elite and upper middle class as well as 
a still-growing number of foreign investors and ‘expats’. It is particularly near the 
picturesque coastline towards the Maputo Bay that many of the new middle class 
condominiums have been built. As one descends from the city centre and drives 
northward out of the city along the Avenida Marginal that runs parallel to the coastline, 
the changing physical environment is immediately visible. Only within the first 
kilometre, there are twelve condominiums in the area bordering the road as well as a 
 
1 The Frelimo mayor Eneas Comiche was removed by the national government, in part for his efforts to 
introduce a cadaster, although he has been reinstated in February of 2019.   
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couple of newly built shopping malls, which will presumably serve the needs of the 
financially active consumers who are now living in the vicinity. But it is not only the 
upper reaches of urban society that is being housed in segregated condominiums near 
the coastline. A few kilometres further out along the newly built ring-road, the housing 
project Casa Jovem was planned to become a financially accessible option for young 
and upwardly mobile Mozambicans between the age of 25 and 40. With prices ranging 
from US$25,000 – 65,000 for individual 35-120 m2 apartments, quite a few young 
middle class urbanites did initially consider Casa Jovem to be a viable solution to their 
immediate housing needs.  
Jacinta David was one of the first young middle-class residents to buy an 
apartment in Casa Jovem. Originally, from Xai-Xai, the capital of the Gaza region, 
Jacinta moved to Maputo with her parents when her father was transferred to a mid-
level position within the Ministry of Agriculture. Shortly after finishing her studies at 
the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, Jacinta got a job as a financial consultant 
in the USA where she stayed for three years before returning to Mozambique in 2012 
determined to make a career as an economist within the state apparatus. Nielsen first 
met Jacinta in the spring of 2015 during a lunch break from her work at the Ministry of 
Finance.  
 
“I really wanted an apartment close to work but most of the buildings in that area 
are completely run down. And so noisy… Also, I was looking for a place where I 
could hang out with people my own age who are interested in the same things as 
me. You know… serious people (pessoas sérios)…” 
  
Since first moving to Maputo, Jacinta’s parents had invested a considerable sum 
of money in real estate and were now keen on helping their daughter buying a nice 
apartment. It was Jacinta’s mother who first read about the Casa Jovem project and 
contacted the Mozambican real estate company to arrange a viewing. “I liked the look 
of the place”, Jacinta told Nielsen. “I could easily imagine myself having a future 
there… friends and even colleagues living nearby. Like-minded people… (laughs)”. 
Unfortunately, though, things did not go as planned. The construction process was 
consistently delayed, and it was soon apparent that the apartment buildings that had 
been erected during the first phase of the project had a number of serious construction 
weaknesses causing, for example, abrupt and prolonged cuts in water and electricity. As 
a direct result of the problem-ridden construction process, many of the young urbanites 
who had initially considered buying apartments in Casa Jovem soon turned their 
attention to other and more viable housing possibilities in condominiums elsewhere in 
the city, such as the ‘Intaka Community’ located on Maputo’s northern periphery.  
The ‘Intaka Community’ is developed through a collaboration between the 
national Housing Fund (Fundo de Fomento de Habitacão FHH), and the Henan Guoji 
Real Estate Ltd., a Chinese construction consortium. When completed, the already 
impressive condominium will be the largest gated community ever built in 
11 
 
Mozambique. The first phase has been concluded and 700 housing units have already 
been built, of which more than 300 are occupied. If the building project is ultimately 
realized in accordance with the initial master plan, the area will comprise 5,000 housing 
units and accommodate an expected population of 15,000–20,000 residents. With an 
average price of approximately US$25,000 for the smallest two-room houses (40 m2) 
and US$90,000 for three-room houses (60–70 m2), Intaka predominantly attracts lower-
level state officials, whose salaries suffice for this kind of state-initiated compound but 
not for the expensive housing units in the luxurious condominiums near the coastline. 
Interestingly, one of the middle-class urbanites who were attracted to the ‘Intaka 
Community’ was Jacinta David. To be sure, it did not take long for Jacinta to realise 
that the initial promises of Casa Jovem would never materialise and she therefore 
started to look elsewhere for more stable housing.  
 
“One of my friends, who works at INCM2 had already bought a house in Intaka. I 
went there one weekend and met his neighbours. It was a nice place. Quiet. And 
the houses looked much nicer than the apartment buildings in Casa Jovem” 
 
Many young urbanites, such as Jacinta David, who bought a three-room house in the 
Intaka Community by getting a loan from her parents have since invested in relatively 
financially accessible housing in the ‘Intaka Community’. Not only does it meet the 
immediate demands for secure housing in an area detached from the chaos and 
dysfunctional infrastructure of the inner-city; it also seems to afford a social community 
of like-minded and entrepreneurial young urbanites with ambitious career plans and 
aspirations of soon advancing within the state system.  
 Housing in Maputo has thus become not only the material base but, as we discuss 
in the next section, also a primary cultural expression of a new, capitalist and modern 
self-identified middle class. As with the socialist political aesthetic, allegiance is still 
expressed through cultural markers, comportment and the ability to surround oneself 
with ‘like-minded’, ‘serious’ people. However, the current configuration of attachment 
to values associated with middle classness is increasingly separate from the nation; the 
symbol of autonomy is being locked away and guarded from the chaos and disorder of 
the existing city by high walls and elaborate security systems. As such, urban housing 
has created a material base for a party-connected social group that identifies as a new, 
modern ‘middle class’, but whose practices nevertheless tend to reproduce the existing 
social order as well as the group’s own dependence on the political elite. 
 
Alienation and Reproduction: the Middle Class Lament  
 





During the summer of 2019, Sumich was speaking to a friend, Evaristo, in a café in 
Sommerschield, one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods in Maputo. Evaristo was talking 
about the last election.  
 
Yes, it looked like Renamo might be able to win here, they had huge rallies in 
Maputo and that has never happened before, crazy. Then 24 hours go by and no 
election results are released, and I am thinking, OK this will obviously be fraud. 
Then, big surprise, they announce that Frelimo has won. You know what I felt? 
Relief! I mean the Renamo guys have been in the bush with nothing for years. 
What is going to happen when they march into Sommerschield, see all these big, 
fancy houses and realise that they all belong to Frelimo people? The need for 
revenge will be strong. God knows what else will happen.  
 
Evaristo’s comments, which display both contempt for and dependence on the 
political order, are strikingly similar to those made by many of the privileged urbanites 
that we have met in Maputo. They refer to ongoing social tension, the brittleness of the 
current system, which they may despise, but which also sustains them and the centrality 
of housing to conceptions of privilege. Crucially, however, these attempts at activating a 
still dominant political aesthetics should not be seen as strategies tied to a nationalist 
ideological struggle. As one of our interlocutors put it: “we (by which she meant 
members of her camada social or social layer) are stuck in the ruins of a collapsed 
project and we do not know how to get out”. Rather, a main ambition for many 
urbanites, who think of themselves as members of the middle class, is to secure one’s 
personal and familial position in a social order that has long been characterized by 
precarity. Either from the purges of the socialist period, the dislocations of the civil war, 
or the constantly shifting terrain of current practise of what is popularly known as 
‘savage capitalism’.   
Those at the other end of the spectrum of ‘middle classness’ need to engage with 
the political aesthetics of the state in a more explicit, less ironically detached manner in 
order for them to establish a viable and secure position from which advancement is 
possible. One must continue to demonstrate loyalty to the state while, at the same time, 
engaging in a variety of provisional aesthetic practices that focus on autonomy and 
security in the hopes of advancement. A prime example of this is the ‘Intaka 
Community’ on the northern periphery of the city discussed earlier. In many ways, the 
layout and physical aesthetics of Intaka resemble those of other gated communities and 
condominiums found throughout sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas (Caldeira 2001; 
de Boeck 2011; Murray 2015): surrounded by three-metre-high brick walls topped with 
an electric fence, an interior space is laid out as straight rows of identical houses 
interspersed with a number of public squares and playgrounds. Eventually, the Intaka 
Community will also have a mall with a supermarket and several small stores to cater to 
the needs of the area’s population who wish to avoid going to the city centre for their 
daily shopping.  
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Hence, while it could be imagined that the initial ambition with the Intaka 
Community was to create a privatized enclave for an assumed growing urban middle 
class, the developers were equally inspired by socialist ideals from Mozambique’s early 
independence years on collective habitation and restricted privacy. Individual plots are 
separated only by small 40- to 50-centimetre-high cement walls or criss-crossed wooden 
‘Belgian’ fences that reach only halfway from the house to the street. Contrary to the 
overall ideal of promoting further collectivism within the gated community, however, 
residents have begun adding additional walls in order to separate themselves from 
neighbours and passers-by. Some have even augmented these new walls, some of which 
are more than three metres high, with additional electric fences or surveillance systems 
to monitor activities on the sidewalk outside their plots. To the main project developer, 
the alterations made by the residents were a cause of continuous frustration and 
bewilderment. Nielsen met up with him at a new coffee shop in the city centre to 
discuss the situation in Intaka:  
 
“What is going on out there? Don’t they know that they are properly protected 
by the guards? I really can’t figure out why they don’t like the area as it is…” 
 
Although the developer was frustrated about the collapse of the collective 
vision, residents were pushing for even more privacy. Gilda was a 32-year-old 
accountant who moved to Intaka in 2015. For the previous six years she had lived in a 
small two-room apartment in the city centre, both to be close to her workplace and also 
to visit her parents on a regular basis. However, when Gilda heard about the possibility 
of affordable houses in Intaka, she did not hesitate to contact the real estate agency. 
‘Living in the city centre is not great’, she told Nielsen during a walk around the 
compound in the fall of 2016. ‘The traffic situation is a mess … And living in an 
apartment, there is so much noise from people in the building, who do not respect their 
neighbours’ right to privacy’. Hence, even with the additional time she had to spend 
commuting back and forth to the city centre every day, it was an easy choice to move to 
Intaka. ‘Ah! And the electricity works here’! Gilda laughed and nodded towards one of 
the streetlights illuminating a nearby playground. ‘In the city, it’s a nightmare. Did you 
know that the power was gone for more than eight hours last week? And in the city 
centre…! Imagine that!’  
Gilda did appreciate the area’s efficient infrastructure and relative calm in contrast 
to the inner city’s noisy chaos, but she did not consider her current housing conditions 
ideal. To her and several other Intaka residents that Nielsen spoke with, a house in the 
walled compound was a preferred alternative primarily because it constituted an 
economically feasible way of moving out of a small and over-priced apartment in one of 
the city’s many dilapidated buildings. Very few (if any!) of the residents were 
particularly impressed by the Mozambican real estate agent’s initial praise of Intaka as 
‘the realization of all Mozambican citizens’ desire to join the middle class’. Throughout 
the years, Frelimo has broken too many promises for Gilda and her peers to believe in a 
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collective middle-class utopia designed in collaboration with a Chinese construction 
consortium, which clearly had no sense of Mozambican housing aesthetics. ‘There is no 
real middle class in Mozambique’, Gilda told Nielsen as he was leaving the 
condominium. ‘Here, the rich make a living from the sweat of the poor’. Hence, rather 
than attempting to fake inclusion in a community that would never be realized, residents 
in Intaka prioritized the privacy of their home by further improving the physical 
separation of individual plots. To Gilda, her house in Intaka was merely a first step 
towards eventually buying a house in one of the city’s luxurious neighbourhoods. Only 
by doing so would she be able to achieve the status and security necessary to avoid the 
uncertainties and everyday hassle that most Mozambicans have to cope with, even if she 
remained uncertain about how to concretely achieve this goal. In order to make such a 
move, Gilda had provisionally appropriated the aesthetics of the state but, in doing so, 
she was already looking forward to a future moment when she could leave it behind and 
assert her own independence. ‘The state is like a wealthy parent’, Gilda said with a 
laugh. ‘You need their money in order to leave them’.  
Ironically, the ability to bypass the state can be considerably more difficult for 
those closer to the centre of power. In such cases, housing can symbolise one’s attempts 
to escape the social order and carve an autonomous space out for oneself but, at the 
same time, the practices necessary to attempt this tend to have the overall effect of 
reproducing relationships of domination. An apt illustration occurred on Sumich’s visit 
with a friend, João, to his quinta (country house or estate). João’s family was well-
established during the colonial period and had been active with Frelimo since the 
liberation struggle. The quinta was acquired by João’s father during the privatization 
period. As they strolled across the spacious, well-tended grounds, João absently issued 
orders to deferential groundskeepers and outlined his plan to leave his government post 
and start businesses on his various properties. While João’s property is part of a material 
strategy to consolidate himself, it is also a symbolic expression of an ideal of autonomy 
that is deeply interlinked with his position of status and moral worth, the cultural 
markers of privilege in Maputo. It is also, we might add, a reflection of the 
contradictions at the core of the political aesthetics of middle classness in Mozambique. 
During the privatization period, João’s father failed to give the party its cut of the 
properties and enterprises he acquired, and the family fell into disgrace. João took a 
low-ranking position at a ministry to try and make amends. The reason Sumich and 
João had driven to the quinta that day had been so that the latter could collect the 
monthly tribute for his boss from the ‘fees’ extracted by the traffic police that lined the 
route. As such, João’s quinta, like other houses of the privileged, manifests the two 
registers of the political aesthetics of middle classness in Mozambique, namely the 
desire and drive towards autonomy even while it bolsters dependence on the powerful.   
 
Conclusion  
While housing has become a primary vehicle for privileged urbanites in Maputo to 
consolidate their positions, the decreasing availability of land, the growing number of 
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contestations over property rights and the overall economic instability are 
fundamentally challenging its future viability to function as such. This precariousness 
has become blindingly obvious during the ongoing financial crisis, which began in 2014 
(Hanlon 2016). After wild borrowing based on dreams of mineral and natural gas 
fuelled abundance, the global price collapse for natural resources has left the 
government on the brink of default, with a long list of legally dubious debts it had 
hitherto hidden from both creditors and its population. Amid rising inflation, disputed 
elections, periodic political violence and sharply depreciating salaries, housing prices 
have begun to fall, hinting that the bubble may finally be bursting and putting the 
material basis of the self-proclaimed middle class at risk. Despite the severity of the 
situation, though, the crisis has not yet caused our interlocutors to alter their strategies; 
if anything, they are intensifying their efforts. Feverish housing construction and 
speculative land transactions continue unabated, although there are growing doubts as to 
whether the seemingly endless number of new construction projects for the privileged 
segments of the Mozambican society will ever be completed. Indeed, despite the 
gloomy projections for an ever more tenuous economic future, a main driver of middle 
classness in Maputo continues to be the search for land and the consolidation of secure 
spaces, such as those found in hubs spread throughout the city for working, shopping, 
dining, drinking, and entertainment.  
In many ways, this tenuous situation illustrates the entrapment of a political 
aesthetic that structures what is considered as ‘sensible’ for those trying to establish a 
viable position in the city on the basis of assumed middle-class autonomy. Ever more 
resources are poured into housing at the same time as the underlying economic and 
political system teeters on the verge of the abyss. As Ranciére tells us, political 
aesthetics refers to a ‘recasting of the distribution of the sensible, a reconfiguration of 
the given perceptual forms’ (2004:63). The manifestation and enactment of a political 
aesthetics is therefore not necessarily a revolutionary overturning of a political 
arrangement but, rather, a gradual and sometimes almost imperceptible realisation that 
an existing social or cultural configuration of meaning carries within it the potentials for 
different kinds of positions and forms of identification. In this regard, political 
aesthetics suggests that different registers of meaning can be activated simultaneously, 
such as the double activation of ‘middle classness’ as distanciation from the ideology of 
a collapsed post-socialist rule and the vehicle for the reproduction of the latter. This 
may, Ranciére argue, potentially allow for new openings, subject positions and spaces 
of identification, to be inscribed in the social fabric even when there seems to be no 
manifest contestation of existing socio-political rights and privileges.      
In Maputo, then, differently positioned urbanites who engage with diverging 
notions of ‘middle classness’ both repudiate and are trapped by a defunct ideological 
project.  In this regard, housing has become the embodiment of a particular political 
aesthetic on two levels. For those closer to the centre of power, it is through the house 
that a wider symbolic vocabulary is articulated that figures social personhood as 
interconnected with the legitimacy of privilege. The house then becomes the emblem of 
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modern citizenship and autonomy, even while the ability to procure it reproduces 
relationships of domination For of somewhat lesser privilege it is the exterior aesthetics 
of the house, which, more than anything, symbolically reverberates with possibilities for 
upward social mobility and a deeper attachment to already sedimented structures of 
economic influence and political authority. There is, then, a shared basis in the political 
aesthetics of urban housing but with varying effects. Whereas for the former, the house 
is what allows for an intensified emphasis on social personhood as a singular and 
partially detached entity, for the latter, the house is the main medium by which to 
symbolically eradicate differences between oneself and the state in order to, eventually, 
also transcend this univocity. Indeed, as Gilda reminded us above, that is the only viable 
strategy for obtaining individual autonomy. Significantly, for both relatively privileged 
groups, the overall effect is the reproduction of an increasingly unstable political order 
that our interlocutors view as corrupt and morally bankrupt, but one to which, for them, 
there is no exteriority.  
 Our research suggests, then, that the configuration of a privileged social group, 
such as the middle class in Mozambique – or anywhere else for that matter – is 
articulated through the political aesthetic that its members are invariably embedded in 
but which they do not necessarily support. The rhetoric of the middle class issuing forth 
from institutions like the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the 
IMF shows a striking resemblance to previous discourses concerning modernization 
theory (Kalb 2014). Once again, citizens can be reshaped into 'rational', autonomous, 
governable subjects. This is a potentially attractive vision for some and bases itself, at 
least in Maputo, on similarities, superficial or otherwise, in the lifestyle and aspirations 
of the particular subject group. However, any sort of social category, such as a ‘middle 
class’, grows out of a particular configuration of domination and inequality. Instead of 
acting as an agent of social transformation, a middle class, as our evidence suggests, can 
be instrumental in reproducing a social order that even they despise.  
 
Acknowledgements 




Andersen, J.E. (2012). Home Space: Socio-Economic Study (Research  
Programme ‘Home Space in African Cities’ funded by the Danish Research 
Council for Innovation 2009-2011). Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of 
Fine Arts, School of Architecture, Department of Human Settlements.  
Buire, C. (2017). “New City, New Citizens?: A Lefebvrian Exploration of State-Led 
Housing and Political Identities in Luanda, Angola.” Transformation, 93, 13 – 40 
Buur, L. (2010). “Xiconhoca: Mozambique’s Ubiquitous Post-Independence Traitor.” 
In Sharika Thiranagama & Tobias Kelly (eds.), Traitors: Suspicion, Intimacy and 
17 
 
the Ethics of State-Building, 24-47. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
Caldeira, T. (2001). City of Walls, Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo. 
Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Castel-Branco, C; C. Cramer, C; & D. Hailu. (2001). “Privatisation and  
Economic Strategy in Mozambique.” Discussion Paper No. 2001/64. London: 
WIDER, United Nations University. 
Costa, A. B. d. (Forthcoming). "Maputo, Urban Mobility and Sociocultural and Spatial 
Transformation Processes." Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 
---. (n.d.). Condominiums and exclusive neighbourhoods in Angola and Mozambique 
(Unpublished manuscript). ISCTE--IUL. 
Cruz e Silva, T. (2001). Protestant Churches and the Formation of Political 
Consciousness in Southern Mozambique (1930-1974). Basel: P. Schlettwein 
Publishing.  
Dalakoglou, D. 2010. “Migrating-Remitting-‘Building’-Dwelling: House-Making as 
‘Proxy’ Presence in Postsocialist Albania.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute, 16, 761-777   
De Boeck, F. (2011). "Inhabiting Ocular Ground: Kinshasa's Future in the Light of 
Congo's Spectral Urban Politics." Cultural Anthropology 26(2): 263-286. 
Dinerman, A. (2006). Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism in Postcolonial 
Africa: The Case of Mozambique, 1975-1994. London & New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
FIAN International Secretariat (2010). Land Grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique. A 
Report on Two Research Missions – and a Human Rights Analysis of Land 
Grabbing. Heidelberg,  
Ferguson, J. (1998). “Transnational topographies of power, Beyond 'The State' and 
'Civil Society' in the study of African politics.” In: H. S. Marcussen and S. 
Arnfred, (Eds.): Concepts and Metaphors, Ideologies, Narratives and Myths in 
Development Discourse. Roskilde, Roskilde University. International 
Development Studies Occasional Paper no. 19: pp. 45-71. 
Gastrow, C. (2017). “Aesthetic Dissent: Urban Redevelopment and Political Belonging 
in Luanda, Angola.” Antipode. 49 (2): 377 – 396 
GlobalPost (online) (2010) Africa’s Middle Class: Striving to Develop a Continent. 
Hanlon, J. (2016). "Following the Donor-Designed Path to Mozambique’s US$2.2 
Billion Secret Debt Deal." Third World Quarterly: 1-18. 
Heiman, R; M. Liechty; & C. Freeman. (2012). “Introduction: Charting an  
Anthropology of the Middle Classes.” In Rachel Heiman, Mark Liechty & Carla 
Freeman (eds.), 3-29. The Global Middle Class: Theorizing Through 
Ethnography. Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press.   
Jenkins, P. (1998). National and international shelter policy initiatives in Mozambique: 
housing the urban poor at the periphery. Centre for Environment and Human 
Settlements, School of Planning and Housing. Edinburgh, Heriot Watt University. 
18 
 
---. (2001). Emerging urban residential land markets in post-Socialist Mozambique: 
The impact on the poor and alternatives to improve land access and urban 
development. Edinburgh, ECA school of planning and housing. Edinburgh 
College of Art / Heriot-Watt University. 
---. (2013). Urbanization, Urbanism and Urbanity in an African City. New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kalb, D. (2014). “Class: The Urban Commons and the Empty Sign of ‘the Middle 
Class’ in the Twenty-First Century.” In Donald Nonini (ed.), 157-176. A 
Companion to Urban Anthropology. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kipnis, A. “Neoliberalism Reified: Suzhi Discourse and Tropes of Neoliberalism in the 
People’s Republic of China.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 13:2, 
(2007): 384-400, 385. 
Lentz, C. (2015). “Elites or Middle Classes? Lessons from Transnational Research for 
the Study of Social Stratification in Africa”. Mainz, Germany, Institut für 
Ethnologie und Afrikastudien, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität. 
Lopes, C. (2015). “Emerging Africa, its Middle Class and New Development 
Challenges.” The Hague, Netherlands, Economic Commission for Africa, United 
Nations. 
McAuslan, P. (2013). Land Law Reform in Eastern Africa: Traditional or 
transformative? A Critical Review of 50 Years of Land Law Reform in Eastern 
Africa. New York, NY, Routledge. 
Mercer, C. (2014). “Middle Class Construction: Domestic Architecture, Aesthetics and 
Anxieties in Tanzania.” Journal of Modern African Studies, 52, 2, 227-250. 
Melber, H. (2016). “The African Middle Class(es) – in the Middle of What?” Review of 
African Political Economy: 1-13. 
Melly, C. (2017). Bottleneck: Moving, Building and Belonging in an African City. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Morange, M., F. Folio, et al. (2012). "The Spread of a Transnational Model: ‘Gated 
Communities’ in Three Southern African Cities (Cape Town, Maputo and 
Windhoek)." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 36(5): 890-
914. 
Mubila, Maurice et al. (2011). The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the Middle 
Class in Africa. African Development Bank: Market Brief April 20th.  
Murray, M. J. (2015). "Waterfall City (Johannesburg): Privatized Urbanism in 
Extremis." Environment and Planning A 47(3): 503-520. 
Ncube, M. and A. Shimeles (2013). The Making of the Middle Class in Africa: 
Evidence from DHS Data. IZA DP no. 7352. Bonn, Germany, Institute for the 
Study of Labor. 
Negrão, J. (2004). Mercado de Terras Urbanas em Mocambique. Maputo, Cruzeiro do 
Sul. 
Nielsen, M. (2014). “The Negativity of Times. Collapsed Futures in Maputo, 
Mozambique.” Social Anthropology 22(2): 213-226. 
---. (2016). Into Architecture. House-building and acentered personhood in Maputo, 
Mozambique in: M. Bille and T. F. Sørensen, (Eds.): Elements of Architecture. 
Assembling Archaeology, Atmosphere and the Performance of Building Spaces. 
London & New York, Routledge: pp. 273-286. 
19 
 
---. (2017). "Ideological Twinning : Socialist aesthetics and political meetings in 
Maputo, Mozambique." Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 23(S1): 
139-153. 
---. (2020 (forthcoming)). "Rooftop Autophagy. Vertical Monadism in Maputo, 
Mozambique." Urban Forum. 
Nielsen, M. and P. Jenkins (2019 (Forthcoming)). "Insurgent aspirations?: Weak Middle 
Class Utopias in Maputo, Mozambique." Critical African Studies. 
Nunes Silva, C., (Ed.) (2015). Urban Planning in Lusophone African Countries. 
Farnham, Ashgate. 
Paasche, T. F. and J. D. Sidaway (2010). "Transecting security and space in Maputo." 
Environment and Planning A 42: 155-1576. 
Paulo, Margarida; C. Rosário & I. Tvedten. (2007). ‘Xiculungo’: Social relations of 
urban poverty in Maputo, Mozambique. Published Report. Bergen: CMI. 
Pinsky, B. (1982). The Urban Problematic in Mozambique: Initial Post-Independence 
Responses, 1975-1980. Major Report No. 21. Centre for Urban and Community 
Studies. University of Toronto. 
Pitcher, A. (2002). Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975-
2000. New York, NY & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
---. (2006). Forgetting from Above and Memory from Below: Strategies of Legitimation 
in Postsocialist Mozambique. Africa 76(1): 88-112. 
――― (2012). Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa’s Democracies. New 
York: Cambridge University Press 
Pow, C-P. (2009). “Neoliberalism and the Aestheticization of New Middle-Class 
Landscapes.” Antipode, 41 (2), 371-390 
Quembo, C. (2009). The Rise of Condominios Fechados in Costa do Sol, Maputo. 
Security, Urban Dynamics and Segregation in: C. Benit-Gbaffou, F. Seyi and E. 
Peyroux (Eds.): Sécurisation des Quartiers et Gouvernance Locale. Enjeux et 
Défis pour les Villes Africaines pp. 
---. (n.d.). How Perceptions Matter: Urban Mobility and Settlement in Maputo and 
Matola (Mozambique) Since Independence (Unpublished manuscript). Maputo. 
Rancière, J. (2004). The Politics of Aesthetics. London, Continuum. 
Roque, S., M. Mucavele, et al. (2016). "Subúrbios and Cityness: Exploring Imbrications 
and Urbanity in Maputo, Mozambique." Journal of Southern African Studies 
42(4): 643-658. 
 Saul, J. S., (Ed.) (1985). A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique. 
New York, NY, Monthly Review Press. 
Schubert, Jon (2016).” Emerging Middle-Class Political Subjectivities in Post-War  
Angola.” In Henning Melber (ed.), Examining the African middle class(es). 
London: Zed Books. 147-158. 
Soares de Oliveira, R. (2015). Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola Since the Civil 
War. London: Hurst & Company. 
Southall, R. 2016. The New Black Middle Class in South Africa, Johannesburg and New 
York, NY: James Currey. 
Spronk, R. (2012). Ambiguous Pleasures: Sexuality and Middle Class Self-Perceptions 
in Nairobi. Oxford, Berghahn. 
20 
 
Sumich, J. (2016, first published online 2015) “The Uncertainty of Prosperity: 
Dependence and the Politics of Middle Class Privilege in Maputo.” Ethnos, 81 
(5), 821-841. 
---. 2018, The Middle Class in Mozambique: The State and the Politics of 
Transformation in Southern Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Swedesurvey (1999). Comparative Study of Real and Documented Land Use and Land 
Occupation and Legal Support to Urban Land Management. First Volume: 
Evaluation of the Existing Situation. Final Report. Maputo, Direcção de 
Construção e Urbanização. 
Vieira, Sergio (1977). The New Man is a Process. A Speech by Sergio Vieira, Member 
of the Central Committee of Frelimo to the Second Conference of the Ministry 
and Culture, held in December. 
Wise, T. A. (2015). "The Great Land Giveaway in Mozambique."   Retrieved 7 April, 
2015, from http://farmlandgrab.org/post/print/24666.  
 
